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APPOINTING JUDGES THE EUROPEAN WAY
Mary L. Volcansek*
I. INTRODUCTION
American politicians deride an undefined “judicial activism,” but
political scientists study a more precise phenomenon that reflects
the growing expansion of judicial power, the “judicialization of
politics.”1  Judicialization occurs in either of two fashions: the judi-
ciary expands its power into new arenas, at the expense of politi-
cians and administrators, or progressively more political activities
outside the judicial realm assume judicial-like qualities.2  Either
strand of judicialization conflicts with notions that courts and
judges should be apolitical, but as Hans Kelsen pointed out in 1926,
judges can never simply declare the law or enunciate the legisla-
tors’ will; every judicial decision is a choice among competing val-
ues.3  Judges exercise political power not just in the annulment of a
legislative act, but also in every courtroom where a criminal case is
heard, a divorce granted, a piece of property seized, custody
awarded, a written treatise protected, or damages ordered.  In
every case some societal value is favored over another, and the es-
sence of politics consists in authoritatively allocating values for
society.4
Who are these judges and how did they attain their powerful po-
sitions?  That question is asked, not only in the United States, but
also in democracies around the world.  To fully understand the pro-
cess for selecting judges, one needs to look beyond the simple act
of appointment and consider a larger phenomenon that is referred
* Mary L. Volcansek is Dean of Humanities and Social Sciences and Professor
of Political Science at Texas Christian University (“TCU”) in Fort Worth, Texas.
Prior to coming to TCU, she taught at Florida International University in Miami,
Florida and also served as Associate Dean of Arts and Sciences, Acting Assistant
Vice President for Academic Affairs, and Chair of Political Science.  She has written
or co-authored five monographs, the most recent of which is Constitutional Politics in
Italy: The Constitutional Court.  She has, in addition to dozens of articles and book
chapters, edited or co-edited four volumes.  The most recent of these is Courts Cross-
ing Borders: Blurring the Lines of Sovereignty, with John F. Stack, Jr.
1. Torbjorn Vallinder, When the Courts Go Marching In, in THE GLOBAL EXPAN-
SION OF JUDICIAL POWER 1, 13 (C. Neal Tate & Torbjorn Vallinder eds., 1995).
2. Id.
3. HANS KELSEN, THE GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND THE STATE 153-54
(Transaction Publishers 2006) (1949).
4. DAVID EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE 350 (1965).
363
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to by political scientists as recruitment.  Recruitment flows in three
stages: certification, selection, and assignment.
The first phase, certification, derives from a person’s status in the
structure of political opportunity, his opportunity costs, and politi-
cal socialization.  The second phase, selection, involves the interac-
tion among aspirants, candidates, sponsors, and the selecting body.
The final phase, role assignment, chooses the candidate and legiti-
mizes his assumption of the office.5
The process operates like a funnel; more and more people are
excluded from consideration at each stage until one is named.
Thus, judicial selection encompasses more than just the point of
selection and involves consideration of who was able to meet the
minimum eligibility requirements and ultimately win out over
others in competition.  Obstacles to achieving the legal degree, ob-
taining the right experiences, or meeting the best political power
brokers are all elements of judicial recruitment, as well as how the
final selection is made.  If one falters at any of the steps preceding
the final point of selection, there is no possibility of obtaining the
office.
The many configurations of judicial selection systems in the
United States and elsewhere all aim to put the best people in the
courtroom, but how do we know who would make the “best”
judge?  Characteristics that most would name are “personal integ-
rity, intelligence, legal ability and judicial temperament,”6 but all
are difficult to recognize and even harder to measure and compare.
Hence, a variety of mechanisms have been developed in the quest
to find a way to recruit and appoint the “best” judges.7
Different goals drive various selection systems.  All seek to name
meritorious judges or, at the very least, legally competent and hon-
est ones.  The decision as to whether the meritorious judges should
be accountable or independent determines, therefore, the choice of
selection method, and neither value compromises the quest for
meritorious judges, at least theoretically.  Of course, recognizing
meritorious judges when we see them poses the same dilemma as
attempting to find and define the best judges.
The American states have devised a variety of mechanisms that
attempt to achieve all three goals, even though reconciling inde-
5. LESTER G. SELIGMAN ET AL., PATTERNS OF RECRUITMENT 14 (1974).
6. Mary L. Volcansek, The Effects of Judicial-Selection Reform: What We Know
and What We Do Not, in THE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL REFORM 79, 80 (Philip L. Du-
bois ed., 1982).
7. Id.
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pendence with accountability may be akin to squaring a circle.
Europeans seem to know which value trumps the other, and that
value is judicial independence.  Even as a new mechanism for ap-
pointing judges in England and Wales was implemented in 2006,8
the Lord Chancellor spoke of his commitment to “the principle of
judicial independence” and noted that “the confidence of both the
public and legal profession in an independent judiciary [is] essen-
tial.”9  The preference for independence over accountability as-
sumes that if the right people are named to the bench, then
accountability should not be a concern.  Indeed, accountability
mechanisms can undermine genuine independence, because judges
should be able to “decide cases impartially as between the par-
ties—without being affected by ‘fear or favour.’”10  Moreover,
should judges fail in some egregious manner to perform their du-
ties as expected, all systems include some mechanism for disciplin-
ing or removing the few errant jurists.11
Judicial independence and judicial impartiality are, in some
ways, flip sides of the same coin; neither can survive without the
other.  The twin concepts have been defined as having “some de-
gree of freedom from one or more competing branches of govern-
ment or from the centers of private power.”12  The more specific
components of judicial independence involve the belief that judges
can decide on their own, even in conflict with what others, political
or judicial, may wish, particularly if a potential for retribution, ei-
ther personally or institutionally, exists.13  “Judicial independence
is not a simple absolute, either present or absent.”14  Between the
poles of total insularity and significant bias and interference lie an
almost infinite number of points.  Even so, “the chief characteristic
distinguishing the courts from the political institutions is judicial
8. Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4 (Eng.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.
uk/acts/en2005/2005en04.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2006).
9. Dep’t for Constitutional Affairs, Judicial Appointments in England and Wales:
Policies and Procedures, http://www.dca.gov.uk/judicial/appointments/japp_ch1.htm
(last visited Oct. 11, 2006).
10. Kate Malleson, Introduction to APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL
POWER: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 3, 6 (Kate Malleson &
Peter H. Russell eds., 2006).
11. See MARY L. VOLCANSEK ET AL., JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT: A CROSS-
NATIONAL COMPARISON 120-24 (1996) [hereinafter VOLCANSEK, JUDICIAL
MISCONDUCT].
12. John R. Schmidhauser, Introduction: The Impact of Political Change upon
Law, Courts and Judicial Elites, 13 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 223, 231 (1992).
13. THEODORE L. BECKER, COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL POLITICS: THE POLITICAL
FUNCTIONINGS OF COURTS 144 (1970).
14. VOLCANSEK, JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT, supra note 11, at 9. R
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independence: independence from government and from political
leadership, independence from political parties and the latest polit-
ical fashion, independence from popular feelings.”15
Judicial accountability implies the converse.  Indeed, a basic
tenet of democratic theory holds that “rulers are held accountable
for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly
through the competition and cooperation of their elected repre-
sentatives.”16  If judicial officers make political decisions and are,
as the argument goes, counted among the rulers, they should not
be independent from government, from political fashions, or from
popular sentiments.  Judges’ professional training and attitudes re-
quire, however, that they hear “every argument, however curious,
and to balance different arguments against each other,”17 and that
cannot happen if a judge weighs the potential political conse-
quences of a decision.  Furthermore, democracy can only work as it
should if independent judges can act to protect against distortions
of democratic processes.18
Looking abroad for examples to inform the American legal sys-
tem is out of fashion, and that holds particularly true for foreign
legal artifacts.  The reluctance, even of scholars, to tackle the
daunting task of exploring foreign legal systems has been explained
by the suggestion that “legal systems and courts may be the most
system specific”19 of any political institutions, making achievement
of desired levels of generalization difficult.  Another explanation
may be the rather enduring insistence on American exceptional-
ism, that notion that the United States is pervasively distinct and
certainly exceptional when compared to other nations.20  Interest-
ingly, however, the United States liberally borrowed and modified
many British institutions, most notably the system of appointing
judges for life at the federal level.  The notion of service at the
king’s pleasure or, as we adapted it, for “good behavior,” was the
sole model for judicial appointment until the 1830s when Jackso-
nian democracy ushered in an elective process for naming judges in
15. TIM KOOPMANS, COURTS AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE
VIEW 250 (2003).
16. Phillippe C. Schmitter & Terry Lynn Karl, What Democracy Is . . . and Is Not,
in THE GLOBAL RESURGENCE OF DEMOCRACY 39, 40 (Larry Diamond & Marc F.
Plattner eds., 1993).
17. KOOPMANS, supra note 15, at 94. R
18. Id. at 95.
19. GREGORY S. MAHLER, COMPARATIVE POLITICS: AN INSTITUTIONAL AND
CROSS-NATIONAL APPROACH 150 (1992).
20. See CHARLES LOCKHART, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: INSTI-
TUTIONS, CULTURE AND POLICIES 2-5 (2003).
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-1\FUJ113.txt unknown Seq: 5  4-APR-07 9:42
2007] THE EUROPEAN WAY 367
some states.21  Despite the disinclination to seek out alternative
modes for naming judges as employed in other places, sometimes
taking a comparative view helps us to see our own system more
clearly or, as philosophers have long taught us, “knowledge of the
self is gained through knowledge of others.”22
Indeed, other nations have frequently looked to the American
system for proto-typical institutions, and the American invention
of judicial review has been imitated around the world, particularly
in countries with a federal form of government.23  The American
systems for selecting judges, with the notable exception of the elec-
tive one, have served as examples, both positive and negative, to
other parts of the world, particularly in the post-World War II
era.24  Most recently, the Judicial Appointments Commission for
naming judges to courts in England and Wales that came into force
in April 2006, looks remarkably similar to the merit selection
processes used in some American states.25  This Article looks at
methods of judicial selection in Europe as a way to contrast and
perhaps better understand and improve the systems of judicial se-
lection used in the United States.
II. JUDICIAL SELECTION IN EUROPE
The selection of judges clearly marks the point where politics
and courts most visibly intersect.  Those writing constitutions
outside of the United States have recognized that fact.  When the
Italian Constituent Assembly met in 1946 to write the post-Fascist
constitution, it permitted selection of judges for the Constitutional
Court to be political, positing that political appointment would be
balanced by fixed term limits.26  “[Fixed term limits are] not due to
21. MARY L. VOLCANSEK & JACQUELINE LUCIENNE LAFON, JUDICIAL SELEC-
TION: THE CROSS-EVOLUTION OF FRENCH AND AMERICAN PRACTICES 75-76 (1988)
[hereinafter VOLCANSEK & LAFON, JUDICIAL SELECTION].
22. MATTEI DOGAN & DOMINIQUE PELASSY, HOW TO COMPARE NATIONS:
STRATEGIES IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS 5 (1990).
23. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 251 (1962).
24. TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL
COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 208 n.6 (2003).
25. Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4, §§ 25-27 (Eng.), available at http://
www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/en2005/2005en04.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2006).
26. MARY L. VOLCANSEK, CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN ITALY 15, 21 (2000)
[hereinafter VOLCANSEK, CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS] (noting that political influence
on judges in Italy is apparent, however, appointments to the Italian Constitutional
Court are for a single, non-renewable term); John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino,
Comparative Avenues in Constitutional Law: Constitutional Structures & Institutional
Designs: Constitutional Adjudication: Lessons from Europe, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1671,
1672, 1676-77 (2004) (noting that Hans Kelsen, the first Chief Justice and architect of
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a rejection in [Germany, Italy, and Spain] of the concept of judicial
independence, but rather to the . . . belief that fixed terms . . . grant
adequate independence while life-tenure would promote irrespon-
sibility, by propitiating that an individual’s constitutional views be-
come engrafted for too long unto the basic document.”27  Similarly,
the Portuguese voiced concerns for balancing the political ideolo-
gies of the judges who would sit on the Constitutional Tribunal
when revising their constitution in 1982.28
Continental Europe devised three models for naming judges:
civil service, shared appointment, and shared appointment with
partisan quotas.  In many of these nations, there are two or even
more types of courts, each with a different mode of appointment.
For example, Italy, France, and Germany all use a civil service
model for the ordinary and administrative courts, but use shared
appointments with political quotas for the constitutional courts.29
The civil service model and the much later constitutional ones that
are separated from the judiciary can both be traced to Napoleonic
France, but were subsequently adopted and adapted across much
of the continent.30  To comprehend the selection mechanisms that
are used, one must first understand the basic political foundations
that led to the creation of each system.
Montesquieu’s concept of separation of powers, elaborated in
The Spirit of the Laws, referred to judges as “the mouth that pro-
nounces the words of the law, mere passive beings, incapable of
moderating either its force or rigor.”31  Although this has been gen-
erally interpreted as a call for a docile and malleable judiciary, in
actuality the very notion of separation of powers was designed to
the Austrian Court, influenced the drafters of the Italian Constitution when they cre-
ated the Italian Constitutional Court); see also Steven G. Calabresi & James Lin-
dgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 769, 821 (2006) (“[E]very other major democratic nation that we know
of—all of which drafted their respective constitutions or otherwise established their
supreme constitutional courts after 1789—has chosen not to follow the American
model of guaranteeing life tenure to justices equivalent to those on our highest
court.”).
27. Jose Julian Alvarez Gonzalez, Another Look at the Discretionary Constitution,
71 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 1, 21 (2002).
28. ANTONIO DE ARAUJO, O TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL (1989-1996) 15 (1997).
29. BECKER, supra note 13, at 88; YVES MENY & ANDREW KNAPP, GOVERNMENT R
AND POLITICS IN WESTERN EUROPE 320-25 (3d ed. 1998); VOLCANSEK & LAFON, JU-
DICIAL SELECTION, supra note 21, at 11. R
30. VOLCANSEK & LAFON, JUDICIAL SELECTION, supra note 21, at 99; VOLCAN- R
SEK, JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT, supra note 11, at 20.
31. CHARLES DE SECONDAT BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS
159 (Prometheus Books 2002) (1748).
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protect the judicial corps from an overbearing executive.32  The
idea of a judiciary that can only serve as the “mouth of the law”33
would logically lead to the evolution of a judiciary that could not
meddle in the affairs of the law-making bodies.  This view was insti-
tutionalized in France in 1790 and remained in force through all of
the later constitutions.34  The Law of 16-24 August 1790 prohibited
courts from interfering with legislation through American-style ju-
dicial review.35  To overrule a legislative enactment would violate
the principle of popular sovereignty, as reflected in the acts of a
popularly elected parliament.36  Declaring a law unconstitutional
was even listed in the penal code as a “punishable offense.”37  In
1799, Napoleon added another element to the equation to limit ju-
dicial interpretation—the codes that form the foundations of the
civil law system.38  The codes were intended to be comprehensive,
such that judges need do no more than locate the proper provision
and apply it to the case.  Napoleon’s desire to systematize the law
resulted in modern code law, namely: Civil Code (1804), Commer-
cial Code (1807), Code of Civil Procedure (1807), Code of Crimi-
nal Instruction (1809), and Penal Code (1810).39  French codes
were borrowed and imitated in Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Italy.40
These late eighteenth and early nineteenth century assumptions
more or less formed the foundation of continental legal systems
until after World War II.  The single exception was the short-lived
Austrian experiment with a constitutional court from 1920 until
1934.41  That judicial body, the handiwork of law professor Hans
Kelsen, would reemerge in the aftermath of the Nazi and Fascist
experiences as a model for many continental judicial systems.42
Kelsen rejected the U.S. model of decentralized judicial review, in
which any court could declare a law in violation of the constitution,
32. Martin Redish & Elizabeth Cisar, If Angels Were to Govern: The Need for
Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 461 (1991).
33. VOLCANSEK & LAFON, JUDICIAL SELECTION, supra note 21, at 51. R
34. ALEC STONE, THE BIRTH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS IN FRANCE: THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL COUNCIL IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 24 (1992).
35. Id. at 25.
36. Id. at 26.
37. Id. at 25.
38. Jacqueline Lucienne Lafon, France, in THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL
POWER, supra note 1, at 289, 290.
39. VOLCANSEK, JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT, supra note 11, at 8. R
40. Id.
41. STONE, supra note 34, at 228. R
42. Id.
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in favor of what he called “constitutional review” that could be
exercised exclusively by the constitutional court, a body separate
and distinct from the judiciary.43  The 1920 Austrian Constitution
was reintroduced at the conclusion of World War II and became
the prototype for subsequent courts in Italy, Germany, Portugal,
Spain, and the European Union.44  A novel variation was also
adopted in France.45  The consequence for judicial selection is that
many European judiciaries have one mechanism for appointing
judges for constitutional courts and a quite distinct one for ordi-
nary and administrative courts.
A. Civil Service Model
The French Constitution of 1799 established the principle of ex-
ecutive appointment of judges for what would later be known as
ordinary courts and separated them from the administrative courts
that could review administrative decisions.46  The French judiciary
was reorganized into a clear hierarchy and, in the first decade of
the nineteenth century, qualifications to hold judicial office were
added.47  In 1808, Napoleon created the position of auditor judges,
a kind of probationary position where one gained judicial experi-
ence.48  Then he required that, beginning in 1810, judges had to be
licensed to practice law.49  Although the former requirement was
abandoned by 1830, the concept later reappeared.50  Competitive
examinations for judicial candidates were instituted in 1875, and
one such examination was given each year.51  That system was
abandoned after 1878, because members of the government real-
ized that they lost control of potential patronage if they could only
appoint candidates scoring well on the examination without regard
for their political persuasions.52  Finally, in 1906, competitive exam-
inations were reinstated and have remained the entry point for the
French judiciary, although exceptions remain for lawyers with ten
years of practice and professors of law.53  The last innovation came
43. KELSEN, supra note 3, at 157.
44. STONE, supra note 34, at 229-30. R
45. Id. at 230.
46. VOLCANSEK & LAFON, JUDICIAL SELECTION, supra note 21, at 100, 108-11. R
47. Id. at 109-10.
48. Id. at 108.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 110.
51. Id. at 109-10.
52. Id. at 110.
53. Id.
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in 1958 when the Centre national d’Etudes judiciaries (National
Center for Judicial Studies) was instituted to train future judges.54
The other Napoleonic principle governing judicial recruitment
was that judges could not be removed from office.55  That principle
did not ensure judicial independence and was violated by politi-
cally motivated purges that accompanied regime changes in 1807,
1810, 1883, and 1941.56  It did, however, serve to make the judiciary
a form of civil service.  When the concept of promotion through
the ranks of the judicial hierarchy was fixed in 1927, the civil ser-
vice nature of the judiciary was complete.57
This civil service model, begun under Napoleon, has been widely
imitated across continental Europe and consciously demarcates a
separation between law and politics.58  Emphasis rests on prag-
matic knowledge and non-interference in the political process.59
Therefore, most civil law countries have systems in which the larg-
est number of magistrates (a term used to connote both judges and
prosecutors) are recruited directly from among young university
graduates who score well on competitive examinations.60  Most
training is on-the-job, under the supervision of more senior
judges.61  The absence of any professional experience outside of
the judiciary also allows for strong socialization within the judicial
corps and a clear separation between the bench and the bar.62  Two
recent changes have, however, affected the process.  More lateral
entry into the judiciary by experienced lawyers now occurs and ju-
dicial schools, like the one begun in France in 1958, now train
judges in Greece, Spain, and Portugal.63  Spain’s Escuela Judicial
Consejo General del Poder Judicial (Judicial School of the General
Council of the Judiciary) in Barcelona was created in 1994 and
trains nearly 250 new judges each year and provides continuing ed-
ucation courses for sitting judges.64  The school organizes competi-
54. Id.
55. Id. at 115.
56. Id. at 110.
57. Id. at 111.
58. STONE, supra note 34, at 226. R
59. Id. at 226-27.
60. CARLO GUARNIERI & PATRIZIA PEDERZOLI, THE POWER OF JUDGES: A COM-
PARATIVE STUDY OF COURTS AND DEMOCRACY 34 (2002).
61. Id. at 35.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. European Judicial Training Network, Spain: Escuela Judicial Consejo General
del PoderJudicial(CEJAJ), http://www.ejtn.net/www/en/html/nodes_main/4_1949_208/
5_1585_25.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2006).
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tive examinations for university law graduates and then trains them
using the case method.65  The Portuguese version similarly accepts
students after completion of their university law training, and entry
is competitive.66  The school’s curriculum includes initial theoreti-
cal training and a type of internship in either a prosecutorial or
judicial setting.67
With some variations on the theme, the civil service model for
appointing judges can be found in Austria, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Swe-
den.68  Notably, it was not the choice for the post-Cold War
democracies of central Europe.69
France was the birthplace of the civil service judicial system, and,
though the foundations were laid in the nineteenth century, the
system remains in place with only some minor modifications.  The
contemporary French ordinary courts continue to serve as passive
bodies, where “[t]he entire culture is oriented to constrain the im-
pact of the personality of the judge.”70  The present French Consti-
tution, implemented in 1958, added a Superior Council of the
Magistrature (Conseil Superieur de la Magistrature), charged with
discipline and promotion of judges.71  In 1959, the first school for
judges, the National Centre of Judicial Studies, renamed in 1970 as
the National School for Magistrates, was established to train those
who succeed on the competitive examination (people with five
years of experience as legal practitioners or in the civil service are
eligible as well) and are destined to become judges and magis-
trates.72  The course of study lasts for thirty-one months, covers
both theoretical and practical elements of judging, and culminates
with an exit examination.73  “Initial appointments are made on the
basis of examination scores, those receiving the highest scores get-
65. Id.
66. European Judicial Training Network, Portugal: Centro de Estudos Judiciarios,
http://www.ejtn.net/www/en/html/nodes_main/4_1949_208/5_1585_23.htm (last visited
Oct. 11, 2006).
67. Id.
68. LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD 96, 555, 588, 604, 765, 1120, 1316-17, 1519,
1566 (Herbert M. Kirtzer ed., 2002); University of Ottawa, Legal Systems: Alphabeti-
cal Index of Legal Jurisdictions, http://www.droitcivil.uottawa.ca/world-legal-systems/
eng-tableau.php (last visited Oct. 11, 2006).
69. For example, it was not the choice for Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland, or Hungary.
LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD, supra note 68, at 675, 1310, 1458-59, 1465.
70. Doris Marie Provine & Antoine Garapon, The Selection of Judges in France, in
APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER, supra note 10, at 176, 182. R
71. Id. at 184-85.
72. Id. at 183-84.
73. Id. at 183.
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ting first pick of the positions.  Most of the graduates are appointed
to a judgeship in the provinces at the lowest level.”74  Advance-
ment within the judiciary is based on seniority and merit, with ac-
tual promotions decided by either the Superior Council of the
Magistrature for the higher courts and on the advice of the Council
for the lower levels; in either case, the formal appointment is made
by the Minister of Justice.75
Traditionally, French judges have not been held in high esteem
by the public or political elites, so they formed a union to defend
their rights. Syndicat de la Magistrature (Magistrates Union) ac-
tively works to protect judges and to preserve the professional val-
ues that dominate the system of appointment and discipline.76
With the introduction of human rights law through the European
Convention of Human Rights77 and the empowerment of national
judges through the European Union, French judges are gaining
greater prestige, and “French public opinion is becoming somewhat
more favourable towards the idea of litigation to achieve social
ends.”78
Germany has a tightly structured system of legal education that
serves as the first hurdle for prospective judges.  A largely govern-
ment-mandated law school curriculum, taking three and a half
years, is followed by at least another two years of internship, if one
passes the rigorous written and oral examinations at the conclusion
of the initial curriculum.79  The internship requires students to
work in various government or judicial offices; the first assignment
is selected for the student, but the longer, second assignment can
be the student’s choice.80  Then, there is a second written and oral
state examination.81  Only fifty percent of those beginning legal
studies successfully complete the course and are able to enter a
branch of the legal service, and only those passing the second state
exam with high honors are eligible to apply to the judiciary.82
Since Germany is a federal nation, entrance to the land or state
74. Id.
75. Jacqueline Lucienne Lafon, The Judicial Career in France: Theory and Practice
under the Fifth Republic, 75 JUDICATURE 97, 101 (1991).
76. Id. at 105-06.
77. See Provine & Garapon, supra note 70, at 179. R
78. Id. at 186.
79. Donald P. Kommers, Autonomy versus Accountability: The German Judiciary,
in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY 131, 143 (Peter H. Russell
& David M. O’Brien, eds. 2001).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 143-44.
82. Id. at 144.
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judiciaries is determined by the state ministry of justice.83  Once
selected, the new judges begin a three-year probationary period
during which time they begin hearing cases, usually at the lowest
court level.84  Movement up the hierarchical ladder of the judiciary
depends on merit, as determined by other, more senior judges and
the state ministry of justice.85  A parallel process occurs for courts
on the federal level, but there are additional minimum age
requirements.86
The Netherlands offers another variation on the civil service
model for the judiciary.87  The Dutch system allows for two poten-
tial routes into the judiciary after one secures a law degree.88  The
first begins with a six-year program of judicial studies after comple-
tion of the law degree.89  That program includes a type of intern-
ship in various legal entities.90  The other route involves working in
a law firm for a minimum of six years before applying for a judge-
ship.91  Applicants from either route take an examination to test
legal knowledge and are also subjected to a psychological test and
a psychological assessment.92  They must submit letters of recom-
mendation and be interviewed by delegates from the seventy-one
person selection committee.93  That committee is dominated by
lawyers, but it also includes prosecutors, high-ranking government
and university officials, and a few representatives of other profes-
sions.94  The committee is self-perpetuating, such that new mem-
bers to it are recommended by sitting members.95  When the
committee ranks candidates, it does so on six or seven criteria, only
one of which relates to knowledge of the law; the remainder are
measures of character.96  The committee offers its recommenda-
tions to the minister of justice who makes the appointments.97
83. See id.
84. Id. at 145.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 147.
87. See Leny E. deGroot-van Leeuwen, Merit Selection and Diversity in the Dutch
Judiciary, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER, supra note 10, at R
145, 150.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 150-51.
95. Id. at 151.
96. See id. at 150.
97. Id.
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The Italian ordinary judiciary presents yet another version of the
French civil service model.  The post-World War II constitution
provided for a Superior Council of the Magistrature to oversee dis-
cipline and promotions, but the extensive training that character-
izes the German, Dutch, and French systems was absent.98  Rather,
upon completing one’s law degree, a state competitive examina-
tion, both written and oral, served as the sole screening device for
admission to the combined corps of judges and prosecutors.99
In Italy, several unions with strong political ideological tenden-
cies represent magistrates and judges, and prosecutors do strike the
protest changes in the legal or judicial system.  The unions run
slates of candidates for those members of the Superior Council of
the Magistrature who are elected by judges.100  Thus, the magis-
trates have opened themselves to the charge that they are
politicized, but at least the political currents of the judges cross the
ideological spectrum.  In April of 2005, however, a new law gov-
erning the magistrature was enacted that separated the
prosecutorial career from the judicial one, introduced a more real-
istic form of examination, and created an educational program for
judges, including a compulsory continuing education component.101
Previously, promotion through the ranks of the judiciary depended
solely on seniority and positive evaluations from the Superior
Council of the Magistrature.102  The basic element that changed
with the 2005 law was that highly competent judges could reach the
higher levels more quickly.103  Many of the arguments supporting
the reform of the judiciary were drawn from the experiences and
models of other European nations.
The virtues of the civil service model lie in its focus on training
judges, protecting them from fickle political winds, and promoting
the meritorious from within the judiciary.  One is not a practicing
lawyer one day and then, after an appointment or an election win,
placed in a totally different role.  The role confusion that results
98. GUARNIERI & PEDERZOLI, supra note 60, at 40-42. R
99. Id. at 40.
100. Mary L. Volcansek, Judicial Selection in Italy: A Civil Service Model with Parti-
san Results, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER, supra note 10, at R
167 [hereinafter Volcansek, Italian Judicial Selection].
101. Patrizia Pederzoli, The Reform of the Judiciary, in ITALIAN POLITICS: QUO
VADIS 153, 157-59 (Carlo Guarnieri & James L. Newell eds., 2005); Ciampi Signs
Judicial Reform into Law, ITALY, July 27, 2005, http://www.italymag.co.uk/2005/news-
from-italy/current-affairs/ciampi-signs-judicial-reform-into-law/.
102. See Pederzoli, supra note 101, at 159-60; Volcansek, Italian Judicial Selection, R
supra note 100, at 165-66. R
103. Pederzoli, supra note 101, at 159-60. R
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from being an advocate and then shifting to being an impartial ar-
biter ceases to be an obstacle.  The system ensures, moreover, judi-
cial independence and freedom from political interference, even
though there exists a measure of influence by the ministries of jus-
tice in judicial selection in most countries.104
The civil service model, on the other hand, does not engender
the level of prestige that judges in common law systems enjoy, and
the judiciary lacks any base of legitimacy other than its commit-
ment to the rule of law.  Incompetent or corrupt judges are rarely
removed from office.105  The civil service model breeds a strong
sense of internal loyalty among its members, but it also insulates
judges from broader social and economic issues that may color the
cases that they are called upon to decide.  Though the civil service
judges may be highly trained, they have little working knowledge
of what running a legal practice on a daily basis requires and may
have little sympathy for the lawyer who is juggling multiple cases
and commitments.
B. Shared Appointment
A shared appointment approach to naming judges is found, at
least in the European context, where there are constitutional
courts.  Constitutional courts are modeled, as mentioned earlier,
on the pre-World War II Austrian example, and their creation con-
stituted a conscious rejection of the U.S. model.106  These courts
are separated from the ordinary and administrative judiciaries and
are co-equal with the executive and legislative bodies.  They exist
solely to apply and interpret the constitution.  Both Italy and West
Germany first adopted constitutional courts in their post-war con-
stitutions, and Spain and Portugal did likewise when they emerged
from dictatorial regimes.107  Luxembourg has recently adopted
one,108 as have the Czech Republic,109 Slovakia,110 Slovenia,111
Lithuania,112 Latvia,113 and Hungary.114  Cases do not reach the
104. GUARNIERI & PEDERZOLI, supra note 60, at 43-45. R
105. See VOLCANSEK, JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT, supra note 11, at 111. R
106. See STONE, supra note 34, at 228. R
107. See id. at 230-33 (noting that West Germany implemented a constitutional
court in 1951); VOLCANSEK, CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS, supra note 26, at 1 (noting
that constitutional courts proliferated in post-war Europe (i.e. the Italian Constitu-
tional Court implemented in 1958) and then later in Spain and Portugal.
108. LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD, supra note 68, at 928. R
109. Id. at 413.
110. Id. at 1458.
111. Id. at 1465.
112. Id. at 919.
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European constitutional courts through an appellate process, as
they do in the United States.  Rather, they are referred, usually by
judges hearing cases that raise issues of constitutional interpreta-
tion, to the constitutional bodies for a definitive interpretation that
sometimes requires that a law or other official action be annulled if
it is deemed to conflict with the interpretation of the constitutional
court.115  In some countries, a priori constitutional review allows
that a law’s validity can be determined by the constitutional body
in advance of a concrete case challenging the application of the
law.116  This was the practice in France and Portugal, and for Spain
as well until 1985.117  Some constitutional courts, like the court in
Germany, allow for a direct challenge of a law’s constitutional ap-
plication by any individual.118  These challenges must involve direct
infringement of specified rights, but “it is quite rare for a law in
itself to cause such direct infringement.”119
Constitutional court judges are typically named through a pro-
cess of shared appointment.  When judges on ordinary courts have
a role in appointments, bridges are created between the ordinary
courts and the constitutional court.  For example, in Germany,
eight of the sixteen constitutional jurists must be chosen from
among judges on the highest courts, and in Italy, five of the fifteen
constitutional jurists are appointed by the judges of the ordinary
and administrative judiciary.120  In a system of shared appointive
authority, partisan politics may or may not play a role, though it
usually does.
In Italy, for example, even those judges named by the ordinary
judges tend to reflect the relative power of the various judicial un-
ions.121  Five others are named by Parliament in a joint sitting of
the two houses and five are appointed by the President of the Re-
public, a largely ceremonial official who represents national
unity.122  Those named by Parliament and in practice by the Presi-
dent of the Republic were, for forty years, apportioned among the
parties according to a negotiated formula.123  Until 1994, that
113. Id. at 855.
114. Id. at 673.
115. STONE, supra note 34, at 228-31. R
116. Id. at 231.
117. Id.
118. MENY & KNAPP, supra note 29, at 331.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 331.
121. VOLCANSEK, CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS , supra note 26, at 22-23.
122. Id. at 21-23.
123. Id. at 22.
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-1\FUJ113.txt unknown Seq: 16  4-APR-07 9:42
378 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIV
formula allowed for two positions for the Christian Democrats, one
each for the Socialist and Communist parties, and one to be ro-
tated among the lay parties.124  When the old Italian political party
system collapsed in 1994, there was no agreed upon allocation, and
nominations were decided by a vote of the two houses in a joint
sitting.125  The result was that a number of vacancies were not filled
through 1995, but when they were finally filled, they tended to fol-
low the general lines of the previous system.126
Judges on the German Constitutional Court are also selected
through a shared appointment system with clear partisan quotas.
The two houses of the German Parliament, the Bundestag and the
Bundesrat, select the judges, but six of them must be selected from
among judges sitting on the highest ordinary and administrative
courts.127  The German Constitutional Court is divided into two
senates, each having different jurisdictions, and judges are ap-
pointed to a specific senate.128  The directly elected Bundestag uses
a judicial selection committee to make all of its appointments,
whereas the Bundesrat, representing the states or lander, involves
the entire chamber in electing judges.129  A two-thirds majority
vote is required for selection.130  Because the two-thirds majority
can lead to a stalemate, each of the two major parties have infor-
mally agreed to each get one-half of the judgeships in each sen-
ate.131  The minor parties obtain their representation on the court
through the allocation of the major party with whom they are in a
coalition.132  Thus, the Free Democratic Party and the Green Party
usually “secure a seat from their larger coalition partner when they
are in government.”133  Since German Constitutional Court judges
serve one non-renewable twelve-year term, when a judge retires
“the party with ‘property rights’ over the seat can choose the re-
124. Id. at 23.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Most continental countries have a system of ordinary and administrative
courts, but Germany also has a system of financial courts, social courts, and labor
courts. DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FED-
ERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 3, 9 (1997).
128. Id. at 8.
129. GEORG VANBERG, THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN GERMANY
83 (2005).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 83-85.
133. Id. at 84-85.
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placement (subject to an informal norm against choosing extreme
candidates).”134
Spain’s 1978 constitution, enacted as Spain emerged from a dic-
tatorial regime, provided for a constitutional court (Tribunal Con-
stitucional) of twelve members, with four judges elected by the
lower house and four by the senate, with a three-fifths majority
required in each.135  Two are named by the prime minister and two
by the governing body of the judiciary, the Consejo General del
Poder Judicial.136 Though the tribunal intends to be apolitical, “in
practice, the system entails political patronage, usually agreed
upon between the major parties.”137
Portugal’s 1982 constitution introduced a slight variation on the
Spanish Constitution.138  Ten of the thirteen judges on the Tribunal
Constitucional are elected by a two-thirds majority of the members
of parliament, Assembleia da Repu´blica, and the remaining three
are selected by the ten elected judges.139  Some consider this to be
a peculiar arrangement; perhaps for this reason there are those
who think all members of the Tribunal Constitucional should be
elected by parliament (regra da cooptac¸a˜o).140  The jurists named
by parliament have reflected an attempt by the two major parties
to preserve a political equilibrium on the tribunal.141
Though the French Constitutional Council stands as a unique hy-
brid institution, created in 1958 to protect the executive from a po-
tentially non-acquiescent parliament, it has evolved into the
weapon of last resort for the parliamentary opposition.142  It is not
a court, per se, and could not be in light of the 1791 prohibition on
a judge’s invalidating any law.143  Therefore, the constitutional va-
lidity of a law can be judged in the Council in the abstract, divorced
from any concrete fact pattern, before it is enacted into law.144  Any
law can be referred to the Council by the President of the Repub-
lic, the Prime Minister, the Presidents of the National Assembly or
134. Id. at 83.
135. MICHAEL T. NEWTON & PETER J. DONAGHY, INSTITUTIONS OF MODERN
SPAIN 26 (1997).
136. Id.
137. PAUL HEYWOOD, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF SPAIN 106 (1995).
138. DE ARAUJO, supra note 28, at 24-25. R
139. CONSTITUTION OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC title VI, art. 222 (7th Revision
2005); DE ARAUJO, supra note 28, at 14, 34, 46. R
140. DE ARAUJO, supra note 28, at 34. R
141. Id. at 47.
142. STONE, supra note 34, at 87.
143. Id. at 23.
144. Id. at 231.
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the Senate, or by sixty senators or sixty deputies before it is
promulgated into law.145  Whereas other constitutional bodies
struggle to demonstrate that they are legal rather than political in-
stitutions, the French Constitutional Council is overtly political,
staffed by politicians for whom the primary criterion for appoint-
ment is partisan affiliation.146  Three of the nine counselors are ap-
pointed by the President of the Republic (not a ceremonial
figurehead), three by the President of the National Assembly, and
three by the President of the Senate; in addition, all former presi-
dents of the republic serve for life.147  “Legal credentials or experi-
ence are not required, though so far, those nominated have had
them.”148
To find an example where shared appointment does not carry at
least a hint of partisan quotas, one must look to the supranational
courts in Europe.  The European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) governs
all interpretation of the EU treaties and, through a referral process
involving the courts in the member states, determines when there
are conflicts between national laws and constitutions and the trea-
ties.149  The ECJ is composed of twenty-five judges, one for each of
the member nations.150  The European Economic Community
Treaty provides that the judges shall “be appointed by common
accord of the Governments of the Member States for a term of six
years.”151  Although there is no nationality requirement, “there is
an unwritten rule that one judge will come from each member
state.”152  The judges are proposed by their nations of origin, and
rarely are nations’ nominations disputed.  Only those who are qual-
ified to be named to the highest courts of their home nations can sit
on the court.153  The extent to which appointments are rotated
among parties or reserved to the majority party reflects the ap-
pointing country’s political culture.154  Therefore, appointments
145. Id. at 57.
146. Id. at 50.
147. Id. at 232.
148. Provine & Garapon, supra note 70, at 182. R
149. The treaties are superior to any national law or constitution, and conflicting
national laws must give way to the European ones.  Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964
E.C.R. 1141.
150. The Court of Justice of the European Communities, The Institution, http://
curia.europa.eu/en/instit/presentationfr/cje.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2006).
151. European Economic Community Treaty art. 167, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
11, at 223.
152. RENAUD DEHOUSEE, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 7 (1994).
153. Id. at 8.
154. See id. at 8, 12.
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-1\FUJ113.txt unknown Seq: 19  4-APR-07 9:42
2007] THE EUROPEAN WAY 381
may carry some partisan overtones.  Some feared that judges
would have a bias toward their individual countries, but there has
been no evidence of that happening.155  Since the six-year term is
renewable, however, if the member nation chooses to propose a
judge for a second or succeeding term, there exists a potential for
political pressure.  In some instances, circumstances suggest that a
given judge was not nominated for a subsequent term because of
decisions of the court.156  The judges are shielded to some extent,
however, by the rule that all decisions are taken collegially.157  No
votes are recorded nor are there dissenting opinions, which makes
the task of a country’s attempting to control or monitor the work
of a given judge impossible.158  It is obvious, however, that nations
wanted to preserve some potential measure of control because dur-
ing negotiations for the Maastrich Treaty, members rejected a pro-
posal from the European Parliament to lengthen judicial tenure to
twelve-year non-renewable terms.159
The European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”), which was
created to enforce the European Convention on Human Rights in
those countries that have ratified the treaty, recognized the right of
individual petition and accepted compulsory jurisdiction.160  The
treaty provides that, “in time of war or other public emergency
threatening the life of the nation,” any country may derogate from
the treaty obligations provided that measures adopted by the coun-
try do not violate obligations under international law.161  During
the “troubles” in Northern Ireland, for example, the U.K. used
derogations to avoid the censure of the ECHR.162
The number of judges on the ECHR equals the number of na-
tions who are members of the Council of Europe (currently forty-
two), but they are, according to the convention, elected by the
Consultative Assembly from a list submitted by the member na-
tions.163  Each country may nominate three people, two of whom
must be its own nationals.164  In reality, only those countries having
155. Id. at 95.
156. Id. at 12.
157. Id. at 13.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 15.
160. Id. at 169.
161. European Convention on Human Rights art. 15, § 1, Nov. 4, 1956, 213
U.N.T.S. 222.
162. DONALD W. JACKSON, THE UNITED KINGDOM CONFRONTS THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 54-55 (1997).
163. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 161, arts. 20-22.
164. Id. art. 22, § 1.
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a representative on the court whose term is expiring submit lists,
and those lists are ranked.  Normally, the Council recommends the
first name on the list, and the Consultative Assembly goes through
the formality of election.165  The assembly has established a prelim-
inary screening committee that reviews resumes and conducts in-
terviews, but that appears to be an ineffective filter.166  The judges
on the ECHR do not preserve their anonymity in the decision-
making process.  Votes are recorded and dissenting opinions are
common.167  Judges serve for nine-year, renewable terms, but no
instances of non-renewal for decisions rendered have been
noted.168
The International Criminal Court (“ICC”), the newest of the su-
pranational courts, has a jurisdiction much wider than Europe,
though it is located in the Hague.  This court’s jurisdiction extends
only to four categories of crimes: genocide, crimes against human-
ity, war crimes, and aggression.169  Its mode of judicial selection
does not neatly fall into one of the three categories listed, but
comes closest to the shared appointment model.  The judge candi-
dates self-nominate, and a body representing all of the signatory
states elects from among them.170  The sharing that occurs is shar-
ing among nations.  The first judges were named in February 2003,
by the Assembly that represents all of the signatory nations.171
Serving on the ICC requires a person to be “of high moral charac-
ter, impartiality and integrity who possess[es] the qualifications re-
quired in their respective States for appointment to the highest
judicial offices.”172  Additionally, they must be fluent in either
French or English, the working languages of the court.173  Forty
nominations were received in 2003 for the eighteen judicial posts,
and more than one-third of those elected were women.174  Candi-
dates are chosen from two lists, one for criminal law expertise and
the other for international law specialization; should one qualify
165. JACKSON, supra note 162, at 12.
166. Ruth Mackenzie & Philippe Sands, Judicial Selection for International Courts,
in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER, supra note 10, at 213, 229. R
167. JACKSON, supra note 162, at 20-26.
168. Id. at 13.
169. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 26 (2004).
170. Id. at 10-21, 177-80.
171. Id. at 20-21.
172. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 36, § 3(a), July 1, 2002,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
173. SCHABAS, supra note 169, at 177.
174. Id. at 20-21.
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for both lists, the candidate chooses on which list to appear.175  In
the first election, ten were selected from the criminal law list and
eight from the international one.176  The judges serve for nine-year
terms, and currently those are not renewable.177
III. CONCLUSION
The American states seek to locate the “elusive balance between
independence and accountability,”178 while Europeans have come
down firmly on the side of judicial independence.  Questions re-
main for both European and American systems.  In the European
context, do the civil service, shared appointments, or shared ap-
pointments with partisan quota models ensure that judges individu-
ally and the judiciary collectively are insulated from external
pressures?  Conversely, does the election process utilized in some
American states truly ensure accountability?  Martin Shapiro ar-
gues that, in the most basic sense, a judge is independent if she has
“not been bribed or was not in some other way a dependent of one
of the parties,” but adds that a judge can never be fully indepen-
dent because she depends on “those for whom she holds office.”179
The civil service model comes the closest of any system to achiev-
ing independence, with its emphasis on the inability of government
officials to remove judges and its thorough socialization of a judi-
cial corps.  Yet, the civil service model typically forfeits judicial
prestige and cannot, as the Italian case teaches, eliminate political
ideology from coloring a judge’s decision.
Independence of decision, though, stands as a defining trait of a
judge.  “The moment a decision is controlled or affected by the
opinions of others or by any form of external influence or pres-
sure,” wrote Henry Lummis, “that moment the judge ceases to ex-
ist.”180  When issues of human rights must be reconciled with
notions of popular sovereignty, judges exercise the prerogative of
deciding between the two competing values.  An independent, non-
majoritarian institution can best check “the way political power is
exercised in order to control its misuse and protect citizens’ free-
175. Id. at 177.
176. Id. at 178.
177. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 172, art. 36, § 9;
SCHABAS, supra note 169, at 179. R
178. Malleson, supra note 10, at 6. R
179. MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 19-20
(1981).
180. HENRY LUMMIS, THE TRIAL JUDGE 10 (1937).
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doms.”181  The counter to that assertion posits that totally indepen-
dent and unaccountable judges lack democratic legitimacy.  But
that argument assumes that all important decisions in a democracy
must be made in a democratic fashion.  Both democratic principles
and the rule of law guide liberal democracies.  By applying the rule
of law, independent judges protect minorities, and “without such a
protection, democracy cannot prosper.”182  Moreover, independent
judges constitute the democratic instrument that protects demo-
cratic processes from distortion.183
European constitutional courts, whose judges are named
through shared appointments and a balance of partisan quotas,
were created in recognition of the fact that politics and judicial de-
cision-making may not be wholly divorced.  “The dream of a Con-
stitutional Court with no political links at all is certainly
unrealistic,” according to Yves Meny and Andrew Knapp.184
Therefore, constitutional courts are generally accepted to be simul-
taneously political and judicial bodies.  Appointing bodies for
judges have achieved a means of guaranteeing that the partisan bi-
ases are balanced.  Through the use of a compromise on partisan
quotas, the French went even further, eschewing any pretense of an
impartial Constitutional Council and boldly and openly appointing
politicians to it.185
The democratic legitimacy of European judges derives from the
intimate connection between democracy and the rule of law.  Le-
gitimacy does not attach, in the public eye, to a single political insti-
tution, but rather to the system as a whole.  Political legitimacy is
most often defined as the “belief that the existing political institu-
tions are the most appropriate ones for the society.”186  Judges who
are appointed or rise through a bureaucratic civil service apparatus
may be an essentially undemocratic element, but they operate,
nonetheless, in a democratic system, just not one that is “democrat-
ically controlled.”187  Appointed judges do not derive their legiti-
macy directly from the electorate, but rather from the whole of the
181. GUARNIERI & PEDERZOLI, supra note 60, at 10. R
182. KOOPMANS, supra note 15, at 95. R
183. See id. at 94-96.
184. MENY & KNAPP, supra note 29, at 333. R
185. Id. at 328.
186. SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN: THE SOCIAL BASES OF POLITICS
64 (Anchor Books 1963) (1960).
187. ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 188 (1989).
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political system and the necessity for guardians of the rule of law.
European systems of appointing judges thus provide legitimacy
while prioritizing judicial independence over accountability.
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